A vertically integrated firm has the incentive and ability to use exclusive contracts to foreclose an equally efficient upstream competitor and to effect a cartelization of the downstream industry. Its ability to do so may be limited when downstream firms are heterogeneous and supply contracts are not contingent on uncertain market conditions. The extent of cartelization depends on the degree of downstream market concentration and on the degree to which downstream competition is localized.
INTRODUCTION
Antitrust scholars have devoted much ink to the competitive effects of vertical mergers (Riordan and Salop, 1995) . For the most part, the economics literature focuses on how vertical integration per se alters pricing incentives in relevant upstream and downstream markets. The Chicago school of antitrust, represented by Bork (1978) , emphasizes that the efficiencies of vertical integration are likely to cause lower prices to final consumers, while a more recent strategic approach to the subject, represented by Ordover, Salop and Saloner (1990) and Hart and Tirole (1990) , shows how vertical integration lacking any redeeming efficiencies might have the opposite purpose and effect. Ma (1997) , Choi and Yi (2000) , Church and Gandal (2000) , and Chen (2001) consider richer models that feature trade-offs between anticompetitive effects and efficiencies. The debate is far from settled, in no small part because workable indicia of harmful vertical mergers are lacking except in special cases (Riordan, 1998) .
The use of exclusive contracts by customers and suppliers in intermediate product markets is equally controversial. The courts and antitrust agencies historically have treated exclusive dealing harshly, finding in many cases such practices illegally to foreclose competition. The Chicago school disputes this approach, advising instead that exclusive contracts are presumptively efficient, because usually it is unprofitable to foreclose competition via exclusive contracts without good efficiency reasons (Bork, 1978) . More recently, industrial organization economists have studied alternative models that demonstrate equilibrium incentives to foreclose more efficient potential entrants with exclusive contracts ( because, as we shall show, the incentive for and effects of exclusive contracts may depend on whether an upstream supplier is vertically integrated, and, conversely, the returns to vertical integration may depend on the possibility of exclusive contracting.
While the existing economics literatures on vertical integration and exclusive contracts yield important insights on the competitive effects of these practices used in isolation, the literatures generally ignore incentives for and effects of these practices in combination. The purpose of this paper is to uncover an unnoticed connection between exclusive contracts and vertical integration, and to develop a model for analyzing how these practices complement each other to achieve an anticompetitive effect. More specifically, we argue that a vertically integrated upstream firm has the ability and incentive to use exclusive contracts to exclude equally efficient upstream competitors and control downstream prices. 1 The ex post effect is a cartelization of the downstream industry. Neither exclusive dealing nor vertical integration alone has this anticomptitive effect.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 previews our basic ideas. We illustrate the relationship between vertical integration and exclusive dealing in a simple model of industrial organization with two identical upstream and two identical downstream firms.
We then discuss potential complications that may arise if the downstream firms are heterogeneous and there are non-contractible uncertainties, providing a transition to our main model with these features. Section 3 studies the main model of the paper. We demonstrate that a vertically integrated firm can profitably employ an exclusive contract to raise input prices and to cartelize the downstream industry, but the cartelization is in general only 1 As discussed later, the Hart and Tirole (1991) model explains the exclusion of only a less efficient competitor. While the Ordover, Salop, and Saloner (1990) model does demonstrate the equilibrium exclusion of an equally efficient competitor, some controversial assumptions of the model limit its applicability (Hart and Tirole, 1991; Reiffen, 1992 ; Ordover, Salop and Saloner, 1992) . 
BASIC IDEAS
That vertical integration and exclusive dealing can combine to foreclose an equally efficient upstream competitor and to raise downstream prices is easy to demonstrate in a simple model of industrial organization. Suppose there are two identical upstream firms, U1 and U2, and two identical downstream firms, D1 and D2. The downstream firms require one unit of an intermediate good to produce one unit of the final good, for which identical consumers have a known reservation price V . Downstream costs per unit of production are equal to C < V and upstream costs are normalized to zero. If the firms are independent, then Bertrand competition in the upstream market followed by Bertrand competition in the downstream market results in a final goods price equal to C. Against this backdrop, a vertically integrated U1-D1 has an incentive to purchase an exclusive right to serve the downstream market and charge final consumers a price equal to V . For example, U1-D1 might pay D2 to withdraw from the market, or, alternatively, acquire D2. Such blatant monopolization likely would meet objections from antitrust authorities. More benign in appearance is an exclusive requirements contract that achieves the same anticompetitive effect. A contract that requires D2 to purchase from U1 at a price of V − C fully extracts monopoly rents from the downstream market. Firm U2 is excluded from the upstream market, and final consumers pay V to purchase from either D1 or D2. 2 It is interesting that D2 does not need much persuasion to agree to purchase its requirements exclusively from U1-D1 on non-competitive terms. If D2 were to decline an exclusive requirements contract with U1-D1, and instead to deal with U2 on competitive terms, then vigorous competition from D1 would squeeze out downstream profits to the point where D2 would be happy to have fallen into U1 's exclusive arms for a small concession, e.g. a small fixed fee. The Chicago school correctly observes that a downstream firm must be compensated to agree to forgo the benefits of upstream competition (Bork, 1978 ), but the above simple model shows that the necessary compensation need not be large if the firm has little to lose because of vigorous downstream competition. 3 An exclusive contract effectively monopolizes the downstream industry, and the monopoly rents can be shared in some measure by all concerned firms.
It also is interesting that neither vertical integration nor exclusive dealing alone achieve these anticompetitive effects if contracts are bilateral. The vertically integrated U1-D1
could not persuade the independent D2 to pay a supra-competitive price for the intermediate good without an exclusive contract, because D2 would retain an ex post incentive to purchase from U2 on competitive terms and cut its retail price to steal business from D1. Similarly, unable to commit to a multilateral contract that binds both D1 and D2, a vertically-separated U1 is unable to pay D1 and D2 enough to induce them both independently to forego the competitive alternative. Thus, vertically-separated upstream firms in equilibrium maximize bilateral profits by offering each downstream firm an efficient 2 The presence of additional equally efficient stand-alone upstream firms does not change the argument.
Furthermore, if there are additional equally efficient stand-alone downstream firms, U1-D1 can offer the same requirement contracts to all stand-alone downstream firms and achieve the monopoly outcome. 3 In formalizing and qualifying Bork's argument, Bernheim and Whinston (1998) realizations for D1 and D2, then it is efficient to assign final consumers to the low cost firm. But if these uncertain downstream market conditions are non-contractible, then U1-D1 would have the conflicting incentives both to exclude and not to exclude D2. U1-D1 generally is unable both to divide the market efficiently and to fully extract rents with a two-part tariff that D2 would accept. Thus, the combination of uncertainty, non- 4 Hart and Tirole (1990) show that, when contracts are private, an unintegrated upstream monopolist similarly fails to achieve the monopoly outcome, and that partial forward integration (with a single downstream firm) solves the upstream monopolist's commitment problem and "restores" monopoly power (Rey and Tirole, 2003) . Alternatively, the upstream monopolist could solve the commitment problem by contracting with a downstream firm exclusively. Our model shows that, when equally efficient firms compete in the upstream market, either full forward integration (with both downstream firms), or a combination of partial vertical integration and exclusive dealing are needed to monopolize the downstream market (even when contracts are public).
contractibility, and heterogeneity appear to create difficulties for ex post cartelization via vertical integration and exclusive dealing.
To understand fully the relationship between vertical integration and exclusive dealing, therefore, it is important to go beyond the simple case of homogeneous downstream firms and to study the relationship under conditions of downstream heterogeneity, uncertainty, and noncontractibility.
In what follows, we analyze a game-theoretic model of an industry possessing these features. This analysis will make clear several points. First, the synergistic relationship between vertical integration and exclusive dealing is not due to the extremely vigorous nature of potential downstream competition between identical producers; rather, it holds more generally in the presence of heterogeneous downstream firms who possess some degree of market power. Second, while the vertically integrated firm has the incentive and ability to exclude upstream competition and cartelize the downstream market, its ability to do so may be reduced with downstream heterogeneity and noncontractible uncertainty.
In particular, the fixed payment needed to persuade D2 to enter the exclusive contract may not be small when downstream firms are heterogeneous, 5 and only partial cartelization of the downstream industry is feasible when downstream monopoly prices vary with non-contractible market conditions. Third, extending the model to multiple independent downstream competitors, while maintaining the assumption of private bilateral contracting, reveals that the degree of ex post cartelization of the downstream industry depends on market concentration and on whether or not competition is localized. Fourth, the exclusive contracts that a vertically integrated firm uses to cartelize the downstream industry are not blatant antitrust violations. The vertically integrated firm subtly employs the marginal wholesale price of a two part tariff to raise the downstream price, and judicially employs the fixed fee to distribute the rents from cartelization. Because a higher wholesale price to downstream rivals also raises the opportunity cost of the vertically integrated firm itself, the elimination of double marginalization is not an efficiency of vertical integration.
HETEROGENEOUS DOWNSTREAM FIRMS
In this section, we study the main model of the paper. After describing the model, we consider a benchmark case in which an upstream monopolist is vertically integrated with one of the downstream duopolists. We then introduce an equally efficient non-integrated upstream competitor, and proves that the vertically integrated firm profitably employs an exclusive contract to achieve the same market outcome as in the upstream monopoly case, except for the distribution of rents between the upstream and downstream industries. We further show that exclusive contracts are irrelevant if the industries are vertically separated.
We complete this section by discussing what happens if the model is extended to allow multiple independent downstream firms.
The Model
The key properties of the model are that the costs of supplying the downstream product are uncertain, heterogeneous, and non-contractible, and requirements contracts are bilateral and private. The model is patterned roughly on markets for cement and concrete markets.
Cement is a fixed proportions input into the production of concrete, and concrete producers typically procure cement supplies under requirements contracts. The demand for readymixed concrete is located at constructions sites that are difficult to predict or specify in contracts. Since delivered ready-mixed concrete requires a cement truck, transportation costs evidently are important and idiosyncratic to the location of the construction sites.
The model captures these cost characteristics with a number of simplifying assumptions.
We revisit cement and concrete markets at the end, when we discuss applications.
There is a single consumer located at x ∈ [0, 1], who is interested in purchasing one unit of a product. 6 The consumer's uncertain reservation value V has a cumulative distribution function F (v) on support [v,v] , where 0 ≤ v <v < ∞. The corresponding probability den-
. The consumer's uncertain reservation value gives 6 It is easy but cumbersome to extend the model to a finite number of consumers.
rise to a well-behaved downward-sloping expected demand curve. 7 The corresponding expected marginal revenue function is also smooth and downward sloping under the following maintained familiar technical assumption:
The downstream market contains two firms D1 and D2 with similar technologies. Each combines a component input with other inputs whose cost is normalized to zero. Additionally, to sell to the consumer D1 incurs transportation costs τx and D2 incurs
where τ > 0 is a fixed parameter, measuring the degree of ex post cost heterogeneity. Thus, the transportation costs of the two firms are negatively correlated. This simple spatial cost structure captures adequately the more general idea of uncertain cost heterogeneity. 8 The downstream firms "bid" prices to the consumer, P 1 and P 2 . At the time of bidding, the firms know x but do not know the realization of V . The consumer's reservation value becomes known only after the downstream firms set prices. The consumer purchases the lower priced product as long as that price is below the consumer's realized reservation value v, and nothing otherwise.
There are two upstream firms U1 and U2. Each can supply the component at the same fixed cost c ≥ 0. Suppose that U1 and D1 are vertically integrated. U1 and U2 each offer D2 a contract requiring D2 to purchase exclusively from U1 or U2. The location of the consumer becomes known after D2 commits to an exclusive supply relationship, but before downstream price competition. At the contract offer stage, x is uncertain and has a standard uniform distribution. Thus D1 and D2 are equally efficient ex ante, but have heterogeneous costs ex post. 7 We could replace the assumption of a random V with the assumption that the consumer has a conventional downward sloping demand curve. 8 The model could be extended to assume that the delivered costs of the two products have a more general bivariate distribution. Alternatively, if the "transportation cost" is incurred directly by the consumer, as often assumed in spatial models of consumer preferences, then the parameter τ measures the degree of horizontal product differentiation.
Consumer characteristics, x and v, are not contractible. The supply contracts are assumed to take the form of a two-part tariff, specifying a fixed transfer payment from D2
to Ui, t i , and a price r i that D2 pays contingent on actual production. 9 The integrated U1-D1 cannot commit to any internal transfer price that is not ex post jointly optimal, nor can anyone commit to a retail price through the supply contracts. The exclusive supplier produces the component only if D2 succeeds in the downstream market. 10 The implicit assumption justifying this approach is that the transaction costs of determining the realization of x, and making the contract depend on this determination, are prohibitively high. 11 The consumer's reservation value is never observed publicly, although it is easy to write a contract contingent on production resulting from the consumer's purchase decision.
To summarize, the timing of the game is as follows:
Stage 1. U1 and U2 offer contracts (t 1 , r 1 ) and (t 2 , r 2 ).
Stage 2. D2 chooses a contract.
Stage 3. x is realized.
Stage 4. D1 and D2 choose prices.
Stage 5. V is realized and the consumer makes a purchase decision.
We assume that contracting actions at Stages 1 and 2 are private. 12 This game of 9 The two-part tariff allows an upstream firm to cartelize the downstream market by raisng the price of the intermediate good (r) above cost (c), while extracting rents with the fixed fee (t). If there were a large number of multiple consumers, then the fixed fee could be reinterpreted as a discount on inframarginal units of the product. Thus a cartelizing contract involves quantity premia. In practice, there are various concessions an integrated firm can make to compensate downstream firms for accepting non-competitive intermediate goods prices. For example, it is common for a manafacturer to provide fixed payments to retailers for promotional actitivities. See also the discussion of cases in the concluding section. 10 Note that ti > 0 means that D2 pays a fee to Ui while ti < 0 means the opposite; and that, if a contract is accepted, ti is paid irrespective of whether any sale is made, but ri is paid only if D2 actually makes a sale. 11 A conceivable possibility, for example, is that contract terms depend on messages exchanged after x is realized, in the spirit of the Nash implementation literature (Maskin, 1985 1 to gain D2's agreement. We assume that D1 believesr 2 = c. 13 . We provide a rationale for this refinement later, after we have introduced more ideas and notation.
Remark 1
The game form ignores the possibility that D2 might decline any exclusive contract and instead purchase on a spot market after learning x. A spot market is irrelevant because in equilibrium U2 offers a requirements contract on terms that are the same as would prevail in the spot market. The spot market price would be c (Hart and Tirole, 1990), providing no advantage compared to U2's contract offer.
We further refine equilibria by requiring that D1 and D2 do not set prices below their costs at Stage 4, and U2 does not offer a contract at Stage 1 that would be unprofitable if accepted by D2. Thus we confine our attention to equilibrium strategies with the property that a player never strictly prefers her offer to be rejected, whether in Stage 1 or in Stage 4 of the game. This property is implied by the stronger requirement that players do not use weakly dominated strategies. But that refinement is too strong for our purposes, because it would eliminate all pure strategy equilibria. 14 were feasible, then vertical integration would not be a necessary ingredient of cartelization (Mathewson and Winter, 1984) . The rationale for the private contracting assumption is developed by Cremer and Riordan . 13 Hart and Tirole (1990) and Rey and Tirole (2003) do not discuss the issue, but implicitly make the same assumption in their analyses of upstream competition when one firm is vertically integrated. 14 This is familiar from other games with infinitely many strategies, e.g. the Bertrand duopoly with cost assymetry (Kreps, 1990 , p. 419, footnote d).
Upstream monopoly
We start our analysis by considering the situation where U1 is the only supplier in the upstream market, and modify Stage 1 accordingly. In particular, if D2 rejects U1 's contract offer at Stage 1, then D1 operates as an unconstrained monopolist. This model provides a benchmark and establishes some preliminary results for our analysis of upstream duopoly.
As there are only two functioning firms, U1-D1 and D2, neither the exclusivity nor the privacy of contracts is an issue in the case of vertically-integrated upstream monopoly.
Suppose that D2 accepts the contract
These are monopoly prices that each downstream firm would offer consumer x in the absence of competition from the other. For any given x and r 1 , P m 1 (x) and P m 2 (x, r 1 ) exist uniquely and satisfy:
where we define
and decreases in p for p > P m 1 (x). These monopoly prices are increasing, and corresponding monopoly profits are decreasing, in marginal costs. Given the regularity assumption A1, we then have:
increases in r 1 and decreases in x, and P m 2 (x, r 1 ) − r 1 − τ (1 − x) decreases in r 1 and increases in x.
We will also make use of the additional technical assumption:
A2 is satisfied if the likely values of V are not too small relative to c + τ . The assumption implies that, if r = c, then U2' s willingness to supply at price equal to cost always constrains U1 's monopoly power. This fact is used in the proof of Proposition 1.
For any contract (t 1 , r 1 ) that is accepted by D2 and for any x, there is an ensuing subgame where D1 and D2 bid prices to the consumer, and the consumer makes a purchase decision.
Now define:
is the sole upstream supplier, then the following is a Nash equilibrium of the D1-D2 pricing subgame: If x ≤ 1 2 , then D1 offers P 1 (x, r 1 ), D2 offers r 1 + τ (1 − x), and the customer selects D1. If x > 1 2 , then D2 offers P 2 (x, r 1 ), D1 offers min{P m 1 (x) , r 1 + τx}, and the customer selects D2.
Given r 1 , P 1 (x, r 1 ) and P 2 (x, r 1 ) are the respective equilibrium prices when x ≤ 1 2 and x > 1 2 . The logic behind the construction of these two prices is as follows: D1's opportunity cost of making a sale (excluding τx), when the sale would have been made by D2, is
, D1 is the low-cost supplier since τx < τ (1 − x). Bertrand competition means that D1 will set its price either at its monopoly level or at the marginal cost of D2, r 1 + τ (1 − x) , whichever is smaller. When x > 1 2 , D2 becomes the low-cost supplier. D1 is willing to lower its price to its marginal opportunity cost r 1 + τx, or, if
, to its monopoly price P m 1 (x) so that the probability of a sale will not be unprofitably low. Bertrand competition means that D2 will set its price either at its monopoly price or at min{P m 1 (x) , r 1 + τx}, whichever is smaller. The equilibrium prices in Lemma 2 are similar to those under Bertrand competition for a duopoly with different constant marginal costs, say c 1 < c 2 , where the equilibrium price is c 2 . Although both sellers charging a price p ∈ (c 1 , c 2 ) can also be supported as a Nash equilibrium, seller 2 would prefer not to be selected as the supplier at such a price. Thus, if
we require that a seller should not strictly prefer to be rejected at the price it bids, the only equilibrium in our pricing game between D1 and D2 is the one characterized in Lemma 2. In what follows, we consider this as the unique (refined) equilibrium in the pricing subgame. 15 Returning to the entire game, we have Lemma 3 If U1 is the sole upstream supplier, and (t 1 , r 1 ) is an equilibrium contract, then
Remark 2 Lemma 3 also holds if D2 has some outside option for obtaining the input.
This extension is relevant for the case of upstream competition considered later.
We next define:
Notice that Π(r) is the joint upstream-downstream industry profit when D2 contracts to purchase from U1 at unit price r, and t (r) is the transfer price that fully extracts rents from the downstream industry. We can now characterize the equilibrium of the game.
Proposition 1
The game where U1 is the only upstream supplier has a unique equilibrium.
At this equilibrium, U1 offers D2 contract ¡t ,r ¢ , which is accepted by D2, wherê
D1 is the seller with price P 1 (x,r) if x ≤ 1 2 , and D2 is the seller with price
15 Notice that mixed strategy equilibria can be ruled out by standard arguments.
P roof. See Appendix C.
The equilibrium contract has a cartelizing effect. By charging D2 a wholesale markup (r −c), U1 raises D2's marginal cost directly, creating an incentive for D2 to raise its prices.
Thus, D2 sells at a higher price when x ≥ 1/2, and is less of a competitive constraint on D1 when x < 1/2. The markup also raises U1-D1's opportunity cost, creating an incentive for D1 to raise its prices and be less of a competitive constraint on D2 when x ≥ 1/2 and P m 2 (x,r) >r + τx. The overall effect is to lessen horizontal competition in the downstream market and to reduce consumer welfare, relative to the situation where the wholesale price for D2 is c. 16 The cartelization of the industry, however, is only partial, due to the assumption that x is not contractible. Full cartelization requires a monopoly price for all values of x. To see this, first consider the consumer at x = 1, where
. Therefore, for consumers sufficiently close to x = 1, we must have P 2 (x,r) > P m 1 (1 − x) , or the price is above the vertically-integrated industry monopoly level. Thus, there is a problem of double marginalization when cost heterogeneity is greatest. Next, consider consumers at or slightly below x = 1 2 . For these consumers, sincer < P m
, or the price is below the vertically-integrated industry monopoly level, i.e. there is a problem of excessive horizontal competition when the downstream firms have similar costs.
The obstacle to full cartelization is non-contractibility, i.e. contract terms do not vary with the location of the final consumer. This fact creates a tension between improving vertical efficiency in some circumstances and intensifying horizontal competition in others. The conflict arises in our model from the downward-sloping expected demand curve generated by the consumer's uncertain reservation price. A lower value ofr causes lower downstream prices by reducing D2 's marginal cost as well as U1 -D1's marginal opportunity cost. Thus, U1 faces a trade-off in setting r 1 . Reducing r 1 alleviates D2 's double marginalization problem at some locations, but also intensifies horizontal price competition elsewhere. Ifr is reduced, neither U1 -D1 nor D2 can commit not to undercut each other for the consumer that is located closer to the rival. The problem is that downstream monopoly prices vary with the location of the consumer; and the single instrumentr cannot achieve these prices in all circumstances.
Upstream Duopoly
We now return to the model where the upstream market is a duopoly. Recall that the contracts offered by U1 and U2 are denoted by (t 1 , r 1 ) and (t 2 , r 2 ), and U1 -D1 does not observe the contract offer that U2 makes to D2. As we assumed earlier, if D2 accepts U2 's contract off the equilibrium path, U1 -D1 believe thatr 2 = c. The following lemma shows that this is implied by the belief that U 2 and D2 have negotiated a contract that maximizes their joint profit.
Lemma 4 Suppose that U2 is the contracted supplier of D2. For any D1's beliefr 2 , U2 and D2's joint profit is maximized when r 2 = c. P roof. For any consumer x ∈ [0, 1] and any price strategy adopted by D1,P 1 (x,r 2 ) , D2 will be the seller to x ifP
and D2 will chargeP 1 (x,r 2 ) for these consumers. Define
is the set of consumers D2 sells to. (D2 may also sell to any consumer with x being such thatP 1 (x,r 2 ) = r 2 + τ (1 − x) , but including these consumers in S 2 (r 2 ) will not change our argument.) The joint profits of U2 and D2 , when U 2 chooses r 2 while D1 holds the beliefr 2 , are
where the inequality is due to the fact that if r 2 > c, a reduction of r 2 to c potentially increases profitable sales for D2; and if r 2 < c, an increase of r 2 to c potentially reduces negative-profit sales for D2.
Thus, the only belief of D1 that is consistent with joint profit-maximization by U2 and D2 isr 2 = c. Choosing r 2 = c is U2-D2's weakly dominant strategy, much like that in a second-price auction bidding her true value is each bidder's weakly dominant strategy.
Here, the true marginal cost to U2-D2 is c. For anyP 1 (x,r 2 ) , choosing r 2 6 = c will only cause D2 to use the wrong marginal cost in competing with D1, causing D2 either not to make sales at prices that are above the true marginal cost or to make sales at prices that are below the true marginal cost.
Remark 3 U1 must have correct beliefs in equilibrium. Therefore, the lemma implies that, if D2 contracts with U2 in an equilibrium, then D1's belief must ber 2 = c.
If D2 contracts with U2, and U1 believes thatr 2 = c, then the profits anticipated by U1 -D1 and by U2 -D2 are:
On the other hand, if D2 contracts with U1, sincer > c from Proposition 1, we have
Therefore, since
the competition between U1 and U2 must mean that in equilibrium, D2 will contract with U1, with U2 offering (0, c) and U1 offering (t * 1 , r * 1 ) , where r * 1 =r, and
Notice that when r 1 increases, P 2 (x, r 1 ) is either unchanged when P 2 (x, r 1 ) = P m 1 (x) , or increases otherwise; and it can be verified that there will be some interval on (
Furthermore, since r * 1 =r, the downstream equilibrium outcome is the same as under upstream monopoly. We have thus shown: Proposition 2 The game where the upstream market is a duopoly has a unique equilibrium.
At this equilibrium, U2 offers D2 (0, c) and U1 offers D2 (t * 1 , r * 1 ) , where r * 1 =r, D2 contracts with U1, and the downstream equilibrium outcome is the same as under upstream monopoly.
Thus, a vertically integrated firm is able to outbid a stand-alone equally efficient supplier for an exclusive relationship with a downstream competitor. When the integrated firm supplies D2 at a price above marginal cost, the former has less incentive to undercut D2 because of the opportunity cost of foregone input sales to D2. This dampening of horizontal competition explains U1 's advantage and ability to preempt U2 (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982) . 17 Because of downstream heterogeneity, the profitable exclusion of U2 may nevertheless cost U1-D1 a substantial amount. However, this cost approaches zero as the difference between D1 and D2 disappears, i.e. t * 1 < 0 and lim τ →0
This "opportunity cost" idea appeared in Chen (2001) , who finds that a vertically integrated firm can only exclude a less efficient supplier. A key reason for our more dramatic result is that we allow two-part tariff contracts in the input market while Chen considers only uniform price contracts. In addition, Chen's model is based on non-exclusive contracts, although he allows some possibility of lock-in due to switching costs.
Remark 4 U1's out-of-equilibrium beliefr 2 = c matters for equilibrium value of t * 1 , but not otherwise for an equilibrium outcome. For example, if U1 believedr 2 > c out of equilibrium, then downstream price competition would be less aggressive if U2 were to deviate and accept U2's offer, and the fixed payment t 1 needed to gain D2's compliance correspondingly would be less. Nevertheless, U1-D1 would still have an incentive to maximize joint profits by setting r 1 =r. Thus the refinement is not crucial for the equilibrium cartelization result.
The exclusion of upstream competition leads to higher downstream prices compared to when U2 supplies D2. The exclusivity of the contract clearly is important for the cartelization outcome under vertical integration. Sincer > c, D2 would want to purchase from U2 ex post as long as r 2 <r, and U2 would be willing to cut r 2 to as low as c to gain D2 's business. This implies that, if upstream firms cannot sign exclusive contracts with downstream firms, perhaps due to legal restrictions or to difficulties in contract enforcement, then the input price to D2 must be set at r 1 = r 2 = c, with t 1 = t 2 = 0. Therefore:
Remark 5
In the game where the upstream market is a duopoly, the cartelization of the downstream market can be achieved only if exclusive requirements contracts are feasible.
Vertical Separation
Earlier, we showed that exclusive contracts used by a vertically integrated firm can achieve the market outcome of an upstream monopolist. To see that vertical integration is important for the cartelization effect of the exclusive contracts, we next consider a variation of our model in which U1 and D1 are vertically separated independent firms. We shall show that exclusive contracts are irrelevant in this case: the equilibrium input price for both downstream firms is c. 18 While we have assumed for simplicity that U1 and U2 are equally efficient, the same logic would hold, and so would Proposition 2, if U2 had a small efficiency advantage. In this case, however, U1-D1 would have an incentive to "outsource" supplies of the input from the more efficient U2.
The timing of the modified game is as follows:
Unlike under the vertical integration of U1 and D1, where D1 always knows D2 's marginal cost when the latter contracts with U1 and D2 always knows the marginal cost of D1, under vertical separation additional issues arise about beliefs when contracts are private.
In particular, now when Dj receives an out-of-equilibrium offer, there is the issue of what it should believe about Di's contract terms. We impose the equilbrium refinement that downstream firms hold "symmetry beliefs" after receiving an out-of-equilibrium contract offer. In a symmetry beliefs equilibrium, Dj believes that Di is offered and accepts the same out-of-equilibrium offer.
Vertical separation and symmetry beliefs yield a competitive outcome in the upstream market. This contrasts with the cartelization outcome under vertical integration.
Proposition 3
The game under vertical separation has an equilibrium with ³ t * j , r * j´= (0, c) for j = 1, 2. Furthermore, there is no equilibrium with r i > c for any i = 1, 2.
Remark 6
We have not ruled out equilibria with r i < c. Any such symmetric equilibrium would be Pareto dominated for the industry by an equilibrium with r i = c. The proposition 19 To be consistent with our earlier analysis, we again assume that these are exclusive contracts requiring a downstream firm to purchase only from a certain upstream firm, although exclusive contracts are not necessary for our result that the intermediate-good price will be equal to c under vertical separation.
is sufficient to establish that importance of vertical integration for the cartelization of the downstream industry.
If both D1 and D2 were to contract only with U1 at input prices above c, then downstream prices would be higher and joint upstream-downstream industry profits would also be higher. Therefore, one might then conjecture that in equilibrium U1 would be able to use exclusive contracts to cartelize the downstream industry as in the case of vertical integration. So why is this not the case in the absence of vertical integration? The reason is that one of the downstream firms can pair with U2 at a lower input price and, given equilibrium beliefs, obtain a joint profit that is more than its joint profit with U1 under the higher input price. This competitive option would frustate any attempt by U1 to use exclusive contracts to cartelize the downstream industry, because it makes it too costly for an independent U1 to gain the compliance of both downstream firms. This reasoning is made precise in Appendix C.
It is noteworthy that the logic for the competitive contracting result under vertical separation depends on the presence of an equally efficient upstream competitor. The symmetry beliefs refinement is not crucial for the competitive contracting outcome.
The same result also obtains under "passive beliefs" if c = 0, although otherwise a passive beliefs equilibrium does not exist in our model. Under passive beliefs, Dj maintains the belief that Di has accepted an equilibrium contract offer even after receiving an out-of- 20 Other approaches yield competitive outcomes even in the case of upstream monopoly. O'Brien and Shaffer (1992) obtain a competitive outcome in the case of upstream monopoly with the "contract equi- Since r * i = c for i = 1, 2, there is no need for exclusive contracts in equilibrium, and firms have equilibrium incentives to negotiate supply arrangements on competitive terms, i.e. exactly as they would in spot markets.
Remark 9 When U1 and D1 are vertically separated, exclusive contracts are irrelevant in equilibrium with a competitive upstream outcome.
Finally, we can modify our arguments to show that our results in this and the previous 21 The literature on private bilateral contracting has studied both passive and symmetry beliefs, as well as . Under wary beliefs a downstream firm who receives an out-of-equilibrium contract reasons that the upstream firm expects the contract to be accepted and has offered the rival downstream firm an acceptable contract that maximizes their joint profits. Wary beliefs equilibria are difficult to analyze because they implicitly involve a complicated hierarchy of beliefs, e.g. D1 's belief about D2 's contract, D1 's belief about D2 's belief about D1 's contract, et cetera. 22 An alternative approach is impose the strategy restriction ri ≥ c, in which case a passive beliefs equilibrium exists and yields the competitive outcome. The strategy restriction might be justified by two different arguments. First, the restriction could be dispensed with by extending the model to include an outside market for the upstream product with a competitive price equal to c. In this case, c is the opportunity cost of diverting supplies from the outside market in order to supply the intermediate good to the downstream market on which our analysis focuses. An implication is that a downstream firm could resell the intermediate good at a price of c, and this resale opportunity would make it unprofitable for an upstream firm ever to offer a contract with ri < c. Second, below-cost pricing might expose an upstream firm to a predatory pricing suit, for which sufficiently high penalties would be a deterrent.
section hold if contracts are bilateral and public. The same is true for our results in the extended models in the appendices. In this case out-of-equilibrium beliefs are irrelevant.
Remark 10 Proposition 3 (and our other main results) also holds if contracts are bilateral and public. Multilateral public contracts would destroy the result. For instance, U1 could offer both D1 and D2 an r that maximizes the joint profits of U1-D1-D2, and if it could further stipulate in the contract that it would reduce r to c if either firm declines the contract, then the contract could be supported in equilibrium.
Extending to Multiple Downstream Firms
Our spatial model of downstream price competition is restrictive in that it only suits the case of downstream duopoly; (our simplifying assumptions of upstream duopoly and a single consumer are easily relaxed.) The logic of our results, however, is more general. In Appendix A, we introduce a generalization of the model, in which n downstream competitors are located at terminal nodes of a symmetric "hub and spoke" network and consumers are distributed uniformly on the connected spokes. 23 This "spokes model" is interesting because it exhibits a strong form of non-localized competition; 24 each downstream firm possesses market power constrained by all other competitors, who are equidistant. 25 In Appendix 23 A key observation for the extension of our results to the spokes model of downstream oligopoly is that prices are strategic complements (Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer, 1985) . Thus, an exclusive contract that raises the marginal input price to a downstream competitor has the benefit of encouraging other downstream rivals to raise their prices also. These infectious effects enable a vertically integrated cartel organizer to achieve higher downstream prices by bringing the entire downstream industry under exclusive contracts. The argument is related to Davidson and Deneckere's (1985) analysis of incentives to form coalitions. 24 Non-localized competition means in general that a consumer may have first-choice preference over downstream products, but no strong second-choice preference, or, alternatively, a consumer has a most-efficient supplier of the downstream product, but other suppliers are equally efficient. For example, consider a case in which a consumer can buy from a single local supplier, or can buy over the Internet from more distant suppliers. Non-localized competition also applies naturally to markets with consumer switching costs. 25 This property is reminiscent of Chamberlinian monopolistic competition; individual firms have power over price while competing against "the market". See also Hart (1985a Hart ( , 1985b ) and Perloff and Salop (1985) .
B, we also analyze a standard circle model of localized competition (Salop, 1979) . While these two cases occurred in different times, countries, and industries, 27 the strategic considerations involved in both of them are remarkably similar to those in our theory. In 26 The discussion of this case is based on Italian Antitrust Authority Annual Report 1994, published on April 30, 1995. We thank Pierluigi Sabbatini of the Italian Antitrust Authority for directing our attention to this case. 27 Interestingly, there is a case similar to TEKAL/ITALCEMENTI (A76) in New Zealand, concerning a vertically integrated cement/concrete company, Fletcher Concrete and Infrastructure Limited, whose pricing behavior in the concrete market has the purpose and effect of excluding competition in the cement market and (eventually) raising concrete prices. In 2002, the New Zealand Commerce Commission investigated the case and issued a warning to the company for risking antitrust violation.
both cases, a vertically integrated upstream producer entered into exclusive contracts with independent downstream firms that excluded other upstream firms from market access. The independent downstream firms appeared to be willing to accept such arrangements because the integrated upstream producer used its downstream facilities to entice and discipline the independents: if the independents purchased inputs from the vertically integrated upstream producer, the vertically integrated downstream producer would compensate the independents by reducing or refraining from competition; otherwise it would aggressively cut prices.
As a result, the vertically integrated firm was able to exclude upstream competitors and likely also raised downstream prices. We also notice that the key features of our model are possibly present in the cases. In particular, for TEKAL/ITALCEMENTI (A76), the different downstream concrete producers likely had different shipping costs for consumers at different locations; downstream market condition was likely to be uncertain in that the location and the demand of a final customer might be unknown ex ante; and pricing contracts between a cement (upstream) producer and a concrete (downstream) producer did not appear to be contingent on the locations of final consumers.
Although the details of the two cases are different from our theoretical model, they do illustrate the empirical relevance of our argument that vertical integration raises heightened concerns about exclusive dealing and vice versa.
APPENDIX A: "SPOKES" MODEL
We develop a new model of price competition by multiple downstream firms that is a natural extension of the duopoly model. In addition to extending our results, the model may also have independent interest in suggesting a new way of modeling non-localized price competition by differentiated oligopolists. To save space, we shall make our arguments mostly informally; and, while we continue to assume that contracts are bilateral and private, we will focus on symmetry beliefs, under which equilibrium always exists. The equilibrium outcomes would be the same under passive beliefs whenever equilibrium exists, but the existence of equilibrium under passive beliefs requires the restrictive assumption that c = 0
or that for some reason downstream firms cannot set r < c. 28 Suppose that the downstream has n ≥ 2 firms, D1, D2, ...Dn. As before, D1 and U 1 are vertically integrated. Each Di is associated with a line of length 1 2 , l i . The two ends of l i are called origins and terminals, respectively. Firm Di is located at the origin of l i , and the lines are so arranged that all the terminals meet at one point, the center. This forms a network of lines connecting competing firms ("spokes"), and a firm can supply the consumer only by traveling on the lines. Ex ante, the consumer is located at any point of this network with equal probabilities. The realized location of the consumer is fully characterized by a vector (l i , x i ), which means that the consumer is on l i with distances of x i to Di and of 29 Obviously, the linear duopoly model is a special case of the spokes model with n = 2.
As in our earlier analysis, consider first the case where U 1 is a monopolist in the upstream market. A contract offered by U 1 to Dj, j = 2, ...n, can be written as (t j , r j ). Modifying 28 Earlier, when D1 and D2 are the only two downstream firms, the vertical integration of U1 and D1 makes private contracting essentially the same as public contracting, since D1 would always know U1 's offer to D2 and D2 would always know the transfer price from U1 to D1 is c. With several vertically independent downstream firms, private contracting potentially becomes a constraint even under the vertical integration of U1 and D1. 29 For the consumer located at the center, we shall denote her by l1, equations (1) and (2), we can define P m 1 (x 1 ) and P m j (x j , r j ) as satisfying
Letr ≡ min{r j : j = 2, ..., n}. Modifying equations (3) and (4) in Section 3, for i = 1, ..., n and j = 2, ..., n, we can define
)
Then, extending Lemma 2, in any downstream pricing game following any given {(t j , r j ) : j = 2, ..., n} , there is a unique (refined) equilibrium outcome, 30 in which D1 sets P 1 ((l i , x i ),r) and Dj sets P j ((l i , x i ), r j ,r), with the equilibrium price for consumer (l i , x i ) being
The presence of additional downstream firms introduces several issues that we must consider in extending the analysis leading to Proposition 1. First, it is now possible that r j 6 = r k for some j, k = 2, ..., n and j 6 = k. Suppose that r k =r < r j for some j = 2, ..., n; i.e., Dk has a cost advantage in supplying (l j , x j ) when 30 As in standard Bertand competition with more than two firms, the strategy profile supporting the unique equilibrium ouctome may not be unique. r k + τ (1 − x j ) < r j + τx j . But Dk cannot benefit from selling to such a consumer, since the competition from D1 will drive the price down to min {P m
. This is because the perceived marginal cost for D1 in supplying such a consumer when Dk is the other potential supplier and purchases from U1 at r k , is c + r k − c = r k .
Second, it immediately follows that to maximize joint upstream-downstream industry profits, we must have (t j , r j ) = (t, r) for j = 2, ..., n; because, if r k < r j for some j 6 = k, then slightly lowering r j has no effect on the competition for consumer (l i , x i ), i 6 = j but increases the expected industry profit from consumer (l j , x j ). This allows us to generalize equations (5) and (6) and define
where Π(r) is the joint industry profits when (t j , r j ) = (t (r) , r) for all j = 2, ...n. The transfer t (r) fully extracts rents from the downstream industry.
Notice that an increase in r has the similar trade off here as in the downstream duopoly case: it affects positively the profit for D1 due to relaxed competition, but affects negatively the profits for each Dj if it worsens the double mark-up distortion. Since the second effect is more important with a higher n, we conclude thatr decreases in n, wherê r = arg max c≤r≤v {Π(r)} .
As in Proposition 1, we will have c ≤ P m
2 τ , and definet = t (r). Third, to complete our argument that there is an equilibrium at which U 1 offers ¡t ,r ¢ to Dj, j = 2, ..., n and these offers are accepted, we need to check that U1 would not benefit from a deviation that privately offers different contracts to one or several Dj.
Suppose that U1 deviates by offering some Dj a contract (t j , r j ) 6 = ¡t ,r ¢ . It is obvious that r j >r cannot be profitable, since such a deviation would have no effect on the competition for consumer (l i , x i ), i 6 = j but decreases the expected profit from consumer (l j , x j ) for U1-Dj. So suppose r j <r. This can have three possible effects: it reduces the expected profit of U1-D1 when the consumer is located on line l 1 , since D1 will face stronger competition from Dj for such consumers; it reduces the joint profit of U1 and Dk but does not benefit Dj when the consumer is located on line l k , k 6 = j 6 = 1, since D1 will match Dj 's lower price for such a consumer; 31 and it may increase the profit for Dj when the consumer is located on line l j and hence Dj may be willing to make a higher transfer payment to U1. Since contracts are private and beliefs are symmetric, potentially the most desirable deviation that U1 can make is to offer every Dj the reduction in r, so that every Dj may be willing to pay a higher t to U1. But then the industry profit will again be given by Π(r) under the new r, as defined by equation (5'). 32 Sincer has already been chosen to maximize Π(r), the new r must lead to a lower Π(r), which means that U1-D1 must lose more than what it gains from the increased payment of every Dj. Thus U1 cannot profitably deviate from ¡t ,r ¢ . Therefore, the proposed is indeed an equilibrium Fourth, we can argue that there can be no other equilibrium under symmetry beliefs. If there were another equilibrium where r 6 =r, U1 could offer a deviating contract with r =r to every Dj, j 6 = 1, resulting in an industry profit Π(r) > Π(r) under symmetry beliefs. 33 This would allow U1 to offer a transfer payment to each Dj so that the deviating offer is accepted. We can thus extend Proposition 1 to the spokes model with n ≥ 2 downstream competitors.
Proposition 1'
The game where U1 is the only upstream supplier has a unique equilibrium, in which U1 offers Dj contract ¡t ,r ¢ , which is accepted by Dj, j = 2, ..., n. Di is the 31 Importantly, D1 is in direct competition with Dj and has both the incentive and ability to constrain Dj whenever Dj attempts to sell to the consumer on l k . This makes it irrelevant that Dk does not observe the contract offer to Dj. 32 The same would be true if beliefs were passive, since D1 knows the lower r for each Dj and each Dj knows that D1 knows that. This mechanism of information exchange undere the vertical integration of U1-D1, in combination with the facts that D1 is in direct competition with every other D firm and that D1
internalizes the opportunity cost to U1 of a lost sale at price r, allows U1-D1 to achieve the outcome as if contracts were public even under passive beliefs. 33 This argument would not apply if beliefs were passive, and thus under passive beliefs there may be other equilibrium if c = 0.
potential seller with price P * ((l i , x i ),r,r) if the consumer is located at (l i , x i ), i = 1, ..., n.
Thus, just as in the downstream duopoly model, the firm that is nearest to the consumer will bid the lowest price and will make the sale if this price does not exceed the consumer's valuation. The equilibriumr is above c for the same reason as in the duopoly case: it reduces downstream competition and thus raises industry profits.
Returning to upstream duopoly, when Dj contracts to purchase from U 2 at (0, c) , D1
consumer is located at (l j , x j ) and i 6 = 1, and thus the (expected) joint profit of U2-Dj is
which is lower than the joint U1-Dj profit underr. 34 Since the expected profit of D2 when it contracts with U 1, excluding any transfer payment, is
we can modify equation (7) to define
) where t * < 0.
To complete our argument for extending Proposition 2, we also need to show that, at the possible equilibrium where Dj contracts with U1 at r =r for j 6 = 1, it would not be profitable for U2 to offer r < c to any subset of D1 ≡ {Dj: j 6 = 1}. Such a deviation can be 34 Again, we note that, due to the vertical integration of U1 and D1, D1 knows if Dj deviates to contracting with U2; and that downstream competition is non-localized so that D1 can effectively compete with Dj for consumers on any l k , k 6 = j 6 = 1.
potentially profitable only if the downstream firms receving the deviating offer expect to sell more than they actually would (and are thus willing to pay more than what would actually cost U2 ). But this is not possible under symmetry beliefs: for any subset of D1 receiving the deviating offer, they will jointly sell more than what they expect, since they will sell to the consumer at all locations including l 1 . Thus the deviation cannot be profitable for U2.
We can thus extend Proposition 2 as follows:
The game where the upstream market is a duopoly has an equilibrium in which U2 offers Dj (0, c) and U1 offers Dj exclusive contract (t * ,r) , and Dj contracts with U1, j = 2, ..., n. This downstream outcome is the same as under upstream monopoly.
The intuition here is the same as in the downstream duopoly case: When the integrated firm supplies D2, ..., Dn at a price above marginal cost, the former has less incentive to undercut the latter because of the opportunity cost of foregone input sales to Dj. This dampening of horizontal competition explains U1 's advantage and ability to preempt U2.
The r that is optimal under upstream monopoly is again chosen to maximize the joint industry profits, and t * is chosen so that each stand-alone firm is willing to enter the exclusive contract with U 1. If any Dj, j = 2, ..., n deviates and contracts with U 2 at (0, c) , D1 will reduce its price to c + τ (1 − x i ) for any consumer located at (l i , x i ) , i 6 = 1, making the expected joint profit between U2-Dj lower than the expected joint profit between U1-Dj underr, which implies that no deviation would occur. 35 Sincer > c, just as in the downstream duopoly case, the use of exclusive contracts is crucial for U 1 to be able to exclude U 2 and to raise the downstream prices.
We can further show that if U1 and D1 are vertically separated, exclusive contracts are irrelevant due to competitive (marginal cost) contracting for the intermediate good, same as in the downstream duopoly case (see Chen and Riordan, 2003) . 35 Notice that since in equilibrium U2 offers (0, c) , adding additional upstream firms that are the same as U2 will not change the results.
APPENDIX B: THE CIRCLE MODEL
We now consider an alternative way of extending our model to multiple downstream firms. Instead of considering non-localized competition in the downstream market, we consider localized competition, adopting the circular city model of Salop (1979) . Assume that the consumer is located with equal chance at any point of a circle with a perimeter equal to 1. Firms are located equidistant from each other on the circle. With n > 2 firms, D1, D2, ..., Dn, the distance between any two neighboring firms is simply In what follows we thus assume that U1 and D1 are vertically integrated. For convenience, we shall focus on the case n = 4, and will in the end discuss the cases n > 4 and n = 3.
With n = 4, D1 competes with D2 and D4 respectively when x ∈ [0, ]. Notice that the only firm D1 does not compete with directly is D3. Denote the contract U1 offers to Dj by (t j , r j ) , j = 2, 3, 4.
As before, we first characterize the equilibrium r j if U1 were the only upstream producer.
(1) We must have r * 3 = c in equilibrium. If r * 3 > c, U1 can deviate by privately offering r 0 3 = r * 3 −ε to D3, where ε > 0 is sufficiently small. This deviation has no effect on the competition between D1 and D2 or between D1
and D4, when the consumer is located on the lower half of the circle, but it increases the joint profit of U1 and D3 when the consumer is located on the upper half of the circle. It would thus be profitable for U1 to make the deviating offer and for D3 to accept the offer, under proper transfer payment. Therefore in equilibrium we must have r * 3 = c. (2) In equilibrium, U1 is able to raise the input price of its neighbors; i.e., r * 2 > c and r * 4 > c, and to raise the final price for the consumer. We shall look for r 2 and r 4 such that the joint profits of U1-D1-D2 are maximized when the consumer is located on the left half of the circle and the joint profits of U1-D1-D4 are maximized when the consumer is located on the right half of the circle. (Note that we already know r * 3 = c.) Because of symmetry, the equilibrium r * 2 and r * 4 would be equal. For consumer x located between D1 and D2 (x ∈ [0, 2 − x, in order for the consumer to be served by either D1 or D2, we need . Therefore, the expected joint profit of U1-D1-D2 when the consumer is located on the left half of the circle is Π (r 2 ) = 2
36 If this condition is not satisfied, then D3 would compete with D1 for consumer x ∈ [0, 1 4 ]. By lowering
τ, the price for x is not changed but the profits to D3 would go to D2. Thus, to look for the optimal r2, we need to restrict to r2 ≤ c + Π (r 2 ) .
Then, since
More generally, if n > 4, in equilibrium we must have r * 2 = r * n > c and r * j = c for j = 3, ..., n − 1; and the downstream equilibrium outcome under upstream duopoly is the same as under upstream monopoly.
The n = 3 case is different because D2 and D3 compete directly both with U1 and with each other. Consequently the joint profit of U1-D1-D2 depends on r 3 . By the theorem of the maximum there exists a continuous bounded function σ (r 3 ) such that r 2 = σ (r 3 ) ≥ c maximizes the joint profit of U1-D1-D2 given any r 3 ≥ c, and by Brouwer's theorem there exists a fixed point r * = r 2 (r * ) that defines a symmetric equilibrium r * 3 = r * 2 = r * . Finally, the joint profit of U1-D1-D2 is increasing in r 2 when r 2 = c, which implies r * > c. From standard arguments in Bertrand competition, P 1 (x, r 1 ) maximizes the joint profits of U1 -D1 given D2 's offer, D2 's offer is optimal for D2 given P 1 (x, r 1 ), and the consumer will select the firm with the lower cost, which is D1 here. The consumer will make the actual purchase if P 1 (x, r 1 ) ≤ v.
Next consider the cases where x > 1 2 . Notice that τx > τ (1 − x) in these cases. Notice also that, since P m 1 (x) − c − τx decreases in x from Lemma 1, we may possibly have
We proceed with two possible situations: (i) Suppose P m 1 (x) > r 1 +τx. At P 2 (x, r 1 ) = min {P m 2 (x, r 1 ), r 1 + τx} , with the customer selecting D2, the expected profit of U1 -D1 is
If D1 undercuts D2 so that it would be selected by the customer, the expected profit of U1 -D1 is less than
On the other hand, given D1 's offer, it is optimal for D2 to charge P 2 (x, r 1 ) and to be selected by the customer. Thus the proposed strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Suppose instead P m 1 (x) ≤ r 1 + τx. We have
. With the same logic as above, competition between D1 and D2 must drive the price down to P m 1 (x) , and the consumer selects D2.
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose that, to the contrary, there is an equilibrium contract (t 1 , r 1 ) will be chosen such that the expected profits of D2 are zero under the respective contracts, it follows that the expected profit for U1 -D1 must be higher under contract (t 0 1 , r 0 1 ) than under contract (t 1 , r 1 ) , which produces a contradiction.
First consider the cases where x ≤ 1 2 . Since τx ≤ τ (1 − x) and
the equilibrium price will be P 1 (x, r 1 ) = P m 1 (x), under either r 1 or r 0 1 , and the customer will select D1. Therefore for x ≤ 1 2 , both contracts produce the same expected industry profits. Now consider the cases where x > We begin with some preliminaries. Let P (x, r 1 , r 2 ) = min {P m (x, r 1 ) , r 2 + τ (1 − x)} with P m = P m (x, r 1 ) defined implicitly by
P m is the monopoly price for D1 to serve a consumer at marginal cost (r 1 + τx). If
[r 2 + τ (1 − x)] is the marginal cost of D2, then equilibrium prices are max {P (x, r 1 , r 2 ) , r 1 + τx} for D1, and max {P (1 − x, r 2 , r 1 ) , r 2 + τ (1 − x)} for D2. Bertrand competition implies that the downstream firm with the lowest marginal cost wins the customer. Thus, if
(r 1 + τx) ≤ [r 2 + τ (1 − x)], the equilibrium outcome is for D1 to serve consumer x at price P (x, r 1 , r 2 ).
Market shares are determined as follows. Letx =x (r 1 , r 2 ) be defined bỹ
¾ .
x is the marginal consumer served by D1, when D1 has marginal cost (r 1 + τx) and D2
has marginal cost [r 2 + τ (1 − x)] .
The joint profits of an upstream-downstream pair are defined as follows. Let π (x, r 1 , r 2 ) = [P (x, r 1 , r 2 ) − c − τx] [1 − F (P (x, r 1 , r 2 ))] .
If D1 accepts Ui 's contract offer, then the expected profit of the Ui-D1 pair is Π(r 1 , r 2 ) = Zx (r 1 ,r 2 ) 0 π (x, r 1 , r 2 ) dx.
We proceed by proving two claims.
Claim 1. There can be no equilibrium where r i > c for any i.
Suppose to the contrary that there is some equilibrium where r i > c for at least one i.
Without loss of generality, suppose that r 1 > c, and r 1 ≥ r 2 . We maintain that firms hold symmetry beliefs. There are two possible cases.
Case 1: r 1 and r 2 are offered by the two different upstream firms, say r 1 by U 1 and r 2 by U2. If r 1 > r 2 , U1 can offer a deviating contract r 0 1 = max{r 2 , c} to D1, which would result in a joint profit for U1-D1 that is higher than their joint profit at the proposed equilibrium.
If r 1 = r 2 = r > c, thenx (r 1 , r 2 ) = 1 2 and U1-D1 's joint profit is Π(r, r). Consider a deviation contract from U1 to D1 with r 0 1 = r − ε > c and ε > 0. Under symmetry beliefs, D1 will set P (x, r − ε, r − ε) for the consumer with x < 1 2 and r − ε + τx for the consumer with x ≥ 1 2 . Since D2 will continue to set r + τ (1 − x) for x < (r − ε − c) [1 − F (r − ε + τx)] dx → δ where δ is some strictly positive constant. Therefore Π(r − ε, r) > Π(r, r) when ε → 0. Thus U1 will make a profitable deviation offer to D1 that will be accepted.
Case 2: r 1 and r 2 are offered by the same upstream firm, say U 1. Denote the joint profit of U1-D1-D2 (or U2-D1-D2) byΠ (r 1 , r 2 ) . If r 1 > r 2 , U2 can offer both D1 and D2 a deviating contract with some optimally chosen r ∈ [r 2 , r 1 ] so thatΠ (r, r) >Π (r 1 , r 2 ) .
Such an r must exist, since with r 1 > r 2 at the proposed equilibrium downstream costs are not minimized. Under symmetriy beliefs, the joint profit for U2-D1-D2 will precisely beΠ (r, r) . Thus U2 will profitably provide enough transfers to both D1 and D2 so that the offer will be accepted. If r 1 = r 2 = r > c, one of the downstream firms, say D1, must receive at most 1 2Π (r, r) . U2 can offer D1 a deviating contract with r 1 = r − ε, and when ε → 0 the joint profit of U2-D1 will be higher than 1 2Π (r, r) . The deviation offer will thus be profitably made and accepted. Claim 2. There exists an equilibrium in which ( t ij , r ij ) = (0, c) for i, j = 1, 2, D1 accepts the contract offered by U1, and D2 accepts the contract offered by U2.
Step 1. There can be no profitable deviations with r i > c. Suppose U 2 (or U1 ) deviates by offering r > c to firm D1 (or to D2 or to both of them). D1 believes that the same offer has been made to D2 as well, and D2 will set P (1 − x, r, r) if x > 1 2 and r +τ (1 − x) otherwise. D1 then needs to receive at least payoff Π (c, r) to be willing to accept the deviation offer, since it can accept U1 's (0,c) contract and expects to receive at least Π (c, r) under symmetry beliefs. 37 Similarly, D2 needs to receive at least profit Π (c, r) to be willing to accept the deviation offer. If U2 makes the deviating offer to D1 only, the joint profit between U2-D1 is no more than Π (r, r) , which is less than Π (c, r) . If U2 makes the deviating offer to both D1 and D2, the joint profit between U2-D1-D2 is no more than Π (r, r) + Π (r, r) , which is less than Π (c, r) + Π (c, r) . In either case, the deviating offer cannot be both acceptable to the downstream firm(s) and be profitable to U2.
Step 2. There can be no profitable deviations with r i < c. Suppose that U 2 deviates by offering r < c to firm D1 (and potentially r 2 ≥ r to D2 ). By accepting the offer, D1 [1 − F (P (1 − x, c, c) )] dx + t.
37 Since D2 's price under the belief that r1 = r > c is higher than its price under the belief that r1 = c, D1 expects a profit that is at least Π (c, r) .
If U2 offers r to D1 and r 2 ≥ r to D2, since all possible sales will be made by D1 and U2 could do better by lowering r 2 to r with more payment from D2, U2 receives at most 
